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   Abstract 
An aging population and the corresponding shrinkage of the labor force will create a 
significant drag on economic growth and may jeopardize the economic well-being of some of 
the elderly. Thus working longer is an imperative – but extending working lives has proven 
difficult, both because workers do not want to work longer and because employers are 
lukewarm about employing older workers. As measures that can be taken to motivate 
workers to work longer, the paper proposes providing retirement incentives and attractive, 
flexible working arrangements. To induce employers to hire old workers, it suggests 
removing the obstacles imposed by restrictive labor market institutions, an increase in the 
human capital of workers via life-long learning, and to addressing age-discrimination. 
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*  
 
Living longer is one of the major achievements of modern societies. Perhaps 
curiously, in developed countries, a longer life expectancy has been accompanied by a long-
term trend of reduced time spent at work. However, there are signs that this paradoxical 
result will have to change. Faced with the prospect of an aging – and shrinking – work force, 
many countries are confronting the challenges of how to mitigate the resulting slowdown of 
GDP growth and how to fix ailing elderly support systems. Extending the working life would 
go a long way toward addressing these challenges.  
 
The obvious question is how to persuade workers to work longer, and employers to 
offer jobs to old workers. What incentives should be provided to old workers to attract them 
to work longer: The prospect of higher pensions? Flexible work arrangements? Better skills? 
Will better health also cause the elderly to work longer? And what will encourage employers 
to keep the elderly on the job: removing institutional obstacles mandating age-related wage 
increases? Increasing mandatory retirement age? Changing outdated attitudes? Subsidizing 
the training of old workers and promoting life-long learning to improve their productivity?  
Particularly in developing countries, moreover, there is also a concern to promote choices 
available to old workers, choices that would both improve job prospects of those who would 
like to work as well as reduce pressures on those who are forced to work until they are unable 
to do so any longer. 
 
The objective of the paper is to summarize labor market implications of population 
aging and to discuss policy options to increase the employment of old workers. The paper 
argues that population aging and ensuing shrinking of the workforce will create a significant 
drag on the economies of developed, transition, and even some developing countries. Thus 
working longer is an imperative: unless countered by productivity increases, working longer, 
                                                 
*The authors are Milvan Vodopivec, The World Bank Group, mvodopivec@worldbank.org and Primoz Dolenc, 
University of Primorska.   
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors.  They do 
not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.    
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or both, population aging and ensuing shrinking of labor force will reduce economic growth 
and may jeopardize the economic well-being of some of the elderly. However, extending 
working lives has proven difficult, both because workers do not want to work longer and 
because employers are lukewarm about employment old workers. Among measures to 
motivate workers to work longer, the paper proposes providing retirement incentives and 
attractive, flexible working arrangements; and to stimulate employers to hire old workers, it 
argues for removing obstacles imposed by restrictive labor market institutions, for increasing 
human capital of workers via life-long learning, and for addressing age discrimination. 
Chances for extending working lives will also increase with improving health of old workers. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses the implications of 
population aging for economic growth. Section 2 examines factors that stand in the way of 
longer working lives – why workers opt for early exit from the labor market, and why 
employers are often lukewarm about employing old workers. In the policy part of the paper, 
Section 3 proposes possible measures to attract workers to work longer, and Section 4 
describes how to remove institutional obstacles and introduce incentives that would make old 
workers more appealing to employers.  
1.  What Are the Growth and Welfare Implications of Population Aging and How to 
Counter Them? 
Population aging is a universal phenomenon that, unless addressed, will create a drag 
on countries’ ability to grow. While developed countries have progressed further in the 
demographic transition, in the next decades most developing countries will experience 
particularly rapid aging (see Figure 1), and the share of population aged 60 years or more in 
these countries will increase from current 63 percent to 79 percent (UN 2007).  Population 
aging and the ensuing reduction of labor force growth – indeed, in many countries, labor 
force shrinkage – may reduce growth rates of countries by as much as one third in 
comparison to growth rates under the stagnant population scenario and may jeopardize 
economic wellbeing of some old people.
1 Aging will loom particularly large for developing 
                                                 
1 One way though which welfare could be reduced is via stressed pension systems that would scale back their 
promises and hurt individuals without alternative arrangements.  
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countries, as by 2050, as many of these countries will have populations as old as Europe or 








Populations are aging due to increased longevity and decreased fertility – and these 
trends will continue, although at a slower pace. According to the OECD (2006), life 
expectancy at birth in all OECD countries strongly increased in the last 50 years (from 64 
years in 1950 to 77 years in 2000); similarly, the average total fertility rate fell from 3.23 in 
1950 to 1.78 in 2000. Increases in life expectancy can be traced over longer periods – 
Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) report a positive, remarkably linear trend for both men and 
women in some of today’s developed countries over the period 1840– 2000.
2 For the future, 
Martins et al (2005) predict a significant slowdown in longevity gains in most developed and 
transition countries, with estimated gains in life expectancy at birth to be 1.2 years per 
decade in the next fifty years (compared to 2.2 years per decade in the last 4 decades). But, 
deceleration aside, this still represents significant increases in longevity. 
 
                                                 
2 Such a trend was observed for Australia, Iceland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland 
and Sweden. According to Oeppen and Vaupel (2002), the four-decade increase in life expectancy during 
1840—2000 was remarkably linear, with a slope equal to 0.24 (R
2 = 0.992). 
 




























Source:  World Bank (1994).  
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Population aging will affect the size and composition of the labor force. Projections 
show that in most developed countries, the workforce will stop growing in the next decade 
unless participation rates rise (OECD 2006, World Bank 2007). Projections for the United 
States are relatively favorable, but the EU25 (i.e., EU prior to accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria) and Japan are at high risk: in the EU25, the growth of the labor force is likely to be 
reversed by the end of this decade (ceteris paribus) whereas Japan’s has been in decline since 
the mid-1990s. As a result, the composition of the labor force is changing, producing a higher 
old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of population over 60 years to population aged 15 to 59) 
as well as a larger ratio of retirees per active workers.  OECD (2006) projections indicate that 
the number of retirees per worker is likely to double from 2000 to 2050 in most member 
countries. In the EU25 area the number of retirees per 100 workers is projected to increase 
from 50 in 2000 to 100 in 2050 (in Spain and Italy even to 130), compared to much more 
favorable ratios for the US, where a ratio of 51 per 100 workers is predicted for 2050. 
 
With labor force growth being one of the sources of economic growth, the slowdown 
of work force growth and its shrinkage may contribute to a slowdown in GDP growth. 
Because of population aging, the forecast of GDP per capita growth in the OECD area is 
reduced to around 1.7 percent per year over the next three decades, bringing about 30 percent 
reduction in comparison to the 1970-2000 growth rate (OECD 2006).  Martins et al (2005) 
estimate that in the next half century, the decline of their workforces will contribute to a 
reduction of the per annum growth rates by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points in France and 
Germany, and by 0.8 percentage points in Japan. Moreover, because of the raising share of 
inactive population, economic growth in Japan, France and Germany will slow down by 
additional 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points, compared to growth under a stable age structure of 
the population. For comparison, about one quarter of the growth of OECD countries in recent 
decades has been attributed to workforce growth (Martins et al 2005). 
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Population aging may also reduce aggregate savings and affect consumption and 
investment patterns. First, the elderly save less than young people (UN 2007).
3 Lower 
savings imply lower capital formation and – ceteris paribus – lower labor productivity and 
slower overall growth. Second, different age groups have different consumption structures: 
on average, old people spend more on housing, social services, and health care; and less on 
motor vehicles, entertainment, and education (Martins et al 2005), and thus population aging 
could affect the structure of aggregate demand. Martins et al (2005), however, argue that if 
elderly labor force  participation increases, their consumption patterns could come closer to 
those of prime-age workers. Third, aging influences aggregate investment decisions because 
old people are more risk averse, which can have impacts on capital accumulation and 
allocation, and the structure of financial markets. And fourth, aging and large increases in 
dependency ratios are likely to place increasing strain on public finances. The OECD (2006) 
estimates that over the coming decades, expenditure on public pensions, and health and long-
term care will increase significantly as a proportion of GDP in most countries. Because such 
public consumption may come at the cost of investment, it may contribute to the reduction of 
capital accumulation. 
 
Population aging, however, may not necessarily reduce economic growth, if 
countervailing factors prevail – the most important among them being the increase of labor 
force workforce participation rates of old workers. A drag on economic growth created by 
population aging could be countered by higher overall (multifactor) productivity, increases of 
labor quality, or increased labor force participation.
4 Simulations for developed countries 
reveal that the most powerful countervailing effects can be expected from the latter – more 
precisely, from the increased labor force participation of old workers. Martins et al (2005) 
show that over the long run, the impact of increased retirement age in line with longevity 
                                                 
3 Panel regression analysis performed by Martins et al (2005) on 30 countries in the period from 1970 to 2003 
indicates that an increase in the share of the old-age population has a strong negative impact on the saving rate – 
more than five times greater than the positive impact of increasing the share of prime-age population. Other 
empirical analyses show that the increase of the old people dependency ratio by 1 percentage point decreased 
the saving rate up to 1.6 percentage points, but precise estimates are debatable (see Turner et al (1998) for 
review of studies’ results). 
4 In most economies, growth is largely driven by developments of multifactor productivity that is mostly 
affected by factors other than population aging, but could be influenced by aging through shifts in consumption 
and pressures on public finances as mentioned above.  
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gains prevails over impact of improved labor quality, and that this effect is particularly large 
for countries currently having low participation rates of older workers. For example, an 
increased labor force participation scenario in France would turn a decline in labor supply 
into an increase in labor supply over the next four decades. In Japan, however, the intensity 
of aging is such that even the combined effect of quality adjustments and increases in 
participation rates is insufficient to prevent an absolute decline in labor supply by 2050. 
Similarly, projections for Eastern and Central European countries show that an increased 
labor force participation of workers aged 40 to 59 years as well those over 60 years old 
significantly slows down the shrinking of the workforce (Muenz 2007). For the Czech 
Republic, for example, an increase in the participation rate for both men and women older 
than 65 years that raises participation rates by 6 percentage points by 2020 compared to 2005 
rates halves the reduction of the workforce predicted under the no-participation-rate-change 
scenario. Similar results are observed for Poland, Bulgaria and the Russian Federation. Even 
some developing countries face a decline in their workforces in the coming decades, and the 
increase of labor force participation would help there, too. For Sri Lanka, for example, it is 
estimated that the increase of women’s participation rate by 20 percent would delay the 
reduction of work force – projected to start around 2030 – by 15 years (Vodopivec and 
Arunatilaka 2007).   
 
Working longer is a win-win-win option. First, as described above, working longer 
boosts workforce growth and helps offsetting the negative effect of population aging on 
economic growth (OECD 2007). Second, longer working lives strengthen public finances as 
more tax revenues are collected and fewer retirement-related expenditures are paid out. And 
third, working longer increases current incomes, allowing the elderly to accumulate more 
savings (which generate also more interest earnings) which can provide larger retirement 
income over a shorter period of inactivity.
5 So why is it difficult to extend working lives and 
what encourages people to withdraw from the labor force even when they are able to work? 
We discuss these topics in turn below.  
                                                 
5 For example, the baby-boom generation (currently in their 50’s) in United States will retire on much different 
terms than previous generations, as a smaller share of pre-retirement earnings will be replaced at any given 
retirement age (Munnell et al 2006).  On the other hand, putting off retirement will produce larger increases in 
retirement income than for workers in the past.  
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2. Why Is It Difficult to Extend Working Lives 
 
Despite increases in life expectancy, the developed world in the last century 
witnessed people leaving work earlier than ever before – a trend that occurred irrespective of 
types of old age support systems and in all developed countries (Kohli et al 1991). For the 
US, the long-term trend of falling retirement age is illustrated in Figure 2. The average male 
retirement age fell particularly strongly before 1980s and stabilized during 1983-2001. Kohli 
et al report similar long-term falling retirement age trends for France, Germany, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom.  Moreover, in the last three decades of the last century even labor force 
participation rates for men aged 55-64 fell precipitously throughout the developed world 
(Palacios 2003).
6 Indeed, since 2000 the number of years men in OECD countries spend out 
of work has exceeded the number of years spent working (ibid.). In the developed world, 
these trends helped to solidify the perception that old age is synonymous with retirement.  
 
 
Figure 2. The average male retirement 
age, USA, 1910-2001 
Note: Average male retirement age is 
defined as the youngest age at which fewer than 
half the men in the age group remain in the 
workforce.  
Source: Burtless and Quinn (2002).   
 
 
                                                 
6 The trends for women are less uniform, but their work force participation in developed world, beyond age of 
65 has never been significant, and their increasing rates of participation at older ages mask the trend to falling 




With people viewing the retirement as their “entitlement,” extending working lives is 
not an easy task. And the problem is not confined to workers – employers, too, are reluctant 
to employ old workers.  Below we discuss the reasons for such preferences.  
People want to retire early  
The dominant factors behind the trend of earlier retirement have been economic 
development and changes in social security systems. Economic development and the 
resulting long-term increase in wealth allowed workers to enjoy rising living standards even 
as they spent a growing percentage of their lives outside the workforce. Another factor 
encouraging earlier retirement over much of the last century – and itself the result of 
underlying economic changes – has been institutional arrangements accommodating such 
trends, including the introduction of mandatory retirement rules. 
In most developed countries, three main paths to retirement – i.e. institutional 
arrangements bridging work life and retirement – can be distinguished. First, if they fail to 
find jobs under regular benefit entitlements, older unemployed workers are often entitled to 
additional, “bridging” unemployment benefits. These benefits consist of cash transfers and/or 
pension credits for state-sponsored retirement schemes, and are provided until they fulfill 
retirement conditions for public pensions.  Second, older workers may be offered state and/or 
enterprise sponsored early retirement schemes, consisting of lump-sum payments for those 
who opt to leave the enterprise. In the last decade, the use of such schemes has been strongly 
reduced. And third, sickness and disability pathway also provides old workers with “interim” 
cash benefits (one of the most cited examples is the 1970s and 1980s program in the 
Netherlands, which was used as a tool for exit of workers in troubled industries (de Vrom 
and Blomsma, 1991). The OECD (2006) reviewed these pathways for all OECD countries. 
 
That these schemes have often not been planned is yet further proof that people want 
to retire early. Often, early retirement pathways emerged as unexpected consequences of 
marginal adjustments to welfare and social insurance systems (Kohli et al 1991). Indeed, 
these systems have often been changed precisely in order to accommodate changes needed in  
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the labor market (for example, Kohli et al report the cases of guaranteed income in France in 
1972 and the emergence of disability insurance in Netherlands in 1973). Often, as one early-
exit program is phased out, another one gains popularity. 
 
That people “are right” in their ambitions to exit the workforce early is in part 
confirmed by research about the satisfaction and well-being of retirees: once retired, people 
are happier than before retirement.  Limited research is available on this topic, but research in 
the US suggests that most individuals are indeed satisfied with their lives in retirement. 
Among the respondents of a nationally representative sample of the U.S. elderly population, 
a majority of persons being fully retired in 2000 stated that their well-being in retirement was 
better than in the years just before retirement, 33 percent found it about the same, and 17 
percent worse than before retirement (Bender and Jivan 2005). Interestingly, according to the 
same research, the flexibility to choose when to retire significantly improved retirement 
satisfaction.  
 
Employers are reluctant to employ older workers 
 
Employers find both advantages and disadvantages to employing old workers. 
According to US surveys, employers view old workers as more reliable and as having better 
skills and a better work ethic, but also find them less suitable for training, resistant to change 
and reluctant to learn new technologies. In particular, one US survey reports the following 
ten reasons why employers are reluctant to hire old workers: shorter career potential, lack of 
energy, higher costs of health and life insurance and pensions, less flexibility/adaptability, 
higher salary expectations, health risks absences, knowledge and skills obsolescence, 
blocking career paths of younger workers, suspicion about competence, and fear of age-
discrimination lawsuits (Lahey 2005). 
 
Beyond perceptions, labor market outcomes for old workers are often much worse 
than for young workers. Evidence about layoffs is instructive: according to Orazem et al 
(2005), during the early transition to market Slovenia’s old workers did not face a greater risk 
of displacement (that is, of a permanent, involuntary job loss), but they were much less likely 
to get a job after losing one, and they faced much larger post-displacement wage losses once  
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again re-employed (the wage loss of workers with 25 to 30 years of experience was 36 
percent, compared to no wage loss of workers with below 10 years of experience). Similar 
results are found for other countries.
7 
 
So what accounts for worse labor market outcomes – are old workers less productive 
than young ones? This is a highly controversial topic, and although the relationship is non-
linear, with large differences across individuals and tasks, one may interpret the evidence as a 
mild “yes.” Studies find strong evidence that after the age of 50, several aspects of physical 
and mental abilities (such as reasoning, numerical abilities, short-tem and long-term 
memory) start to decline, with the decline often being progressive and varying substantially 
from one person to another (OECD 2006). In contrast, some verbal abilities remain virtually 
unchanged also late in the life cycle.  
 
Strong evidence that older workers are less productive than young ones comes from 
studies based on matched employer-employee data sets. For example, the OECD (2006) 
summarized two studies of the productivity of French and American firms which found that 
workers aged 55 and over are less productive than younger workers. Moreover, a similar 
study on Slovenia finds that over 1992-2001 period, young workers (aged 30 or younger) 
were 7 percent more productive than workers aged 50 or over, and that the period witnessed 
a strong reversal of relative productivity: in 1992, older workers were more productive than 
young workers (the productivity advantage of workers 50 years over workers younger than 
30 was 41 percent), but by 2001 they were 13 percent less productive (Vodopivec 2007). The 
reversal occurred because the transition to a market economy forced enterprises to restructure 
and this process destroyed the advantage of old workers:  their job-specific skills 
(restructuring involved abandoning old production lines and introducing new ones, a process 
that produced significant worker layoffs – see World Bank (2005)) and boosted the 
advantage of young workers, namely the ability to adjust to changes in the environment. This 
result is telling about the differences in productivity between old and young workers. 
Interestingly, Vodopivec (2007) also reports that in 2001, old workers retained their 
                                                 
7 See, for example, evidence on US workers in Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Kletzer and Fairlie 
(2003), and OECD (1998) for OECD countries.  
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advantage in terms of higher relative wages, with wages of aged 50 or over being 43 percent 
above the workers younger than 30, all other things being equal.   
 
However, the above findings are also consistent with the claim that individual 
productivity may not decline with age if additional investments in human capital are made. 
Indeed, a study on firm-level productivity (a study of a car assembly plant) shows that 
productivity monotonically decreases with age and increases commensurate with job tenure, 
with the opposing effects approximately canceling out (Ilmakunnas et al 2007). Furthermore 
if workers expect their working lives to be longer, they will be more motivated to take 
training. We turn now to the overall questions of incentives that may entice workers to work 
longer. 
 
3. How to Improve Incentives of People to Work Longer- and Their Workplace 
Choices? 
  
The above trend of a steadily decreasing retirement age is a result of people “voting 
with their feet” – but shouldn’t we also listen to their voice? Interestingly, a large HSBC 
survey of over 21,000 adults, some of whom are identified as “trendsetters,” in 20 countries 
across five continents, suggests that people may be changing their vision of later life and 
opting for more active aging. When asked how they want to spend retirement, more than half 
of the people in each country included paid work in their ideal plan (with Japan with 95 
percent at the top and Hong Kong with 57 percent at the bottom). Perhaps surprisingly, a 
higher share of people in developed countries than in less affluent countries wants to carry on 
working in retirement. Earning money was the most prevalent reason, but other important 
reasons were also having a mental stimulation, having something valuable and meaningful to 
do, and connecting with others. In general, while mostly they want their retirement centered 
on families, friends and fitness, the results of the survey suggest that people are increasingly 
viewing retirement as an opportunity “for a whole new chapter in life” (see Box 1 for 

















Optimistic though the above views may be, this section argues that it is possible to 
motivate workers to work longer if they are provided with suitable incentives, if they are 
offered attractive and flexible working arrangements, and if they are in good health. Among 
the considerations that influence decisions about work and retirement, this section thus 
mostly focuses on the so-called pull factors of retirement, with the push factors being 
addressed in the next section (see Box 2 on the distinction between push and pull factors).  In 
developing countries, the ways to improve choice of workers identified above are relevant 
primarily for formal sector workers; many informal sector workers would benefit from a 
different type of choice – the ability to withdraw from the labor market, a choice many of 








Box 1: How different countries view old age and retirement 
 
Canadians view their later years as a time of reinvention, ambition, and close relationships with friends and 
family.  
Americans view their later years as a time for opportunity, new careers, and spiritual fulfilment, but are less 
focused on family or health than other countries. 
The French view these years as a time of dreams and aspirations, but also as a time of worry, and they are 
concerned about being a burden to their families. 
People in the UK view later life as a time of self-sufficiency, independence, and personal responsibility, 
counting on neither government nor family to care for them. 
Brazilians view later life as a time for slowing down, relaxing, and spending time with their families, relatives, 
and friends, and they expect significant support from their children.  
Mexicans see it as a time for continued work and hard-earned financial stability.  
In China, younger generations view retirement as an opportunity for a new life but continued careers, while 
older generations want to stop working and relax. All Chinese people view family as an important source of 
happiness and support.  
Respondents from Hong Kong view it as a time for rest, relaxation, and the enjoyment of accumulated wealth, 
which is seen as the cornerstone of well-being . 
Indians view later life as a time to live with and be cared for by their families. 
The Japanese look forward to their later years as a time of good health, family considerations and continued 
fulfillment from work. 
 
























Improving financial incentives to work  
 
One of the most important incentives to work longer is provided by the financial 
benefit of staying active. A high replacement rate and consequently a high implicit tax on 
continued work pushes workers towards early labor market withdrawal (Duval 2003).
 8 In 
OECD countries, the implicit tax rate is highest in Italy, the Netherlands, France and 
Luxembourg – and these countries also witness the strongest reductions of participation rates 
of workers aged 65 years or more. On the other hand, in countries with low implicit tax on 
continued work (such as Korea, Sweden, United States, where the implicit tax rate is below 
10 percent) the reduction of participation rates of higher age groups is much smaller.  
 
Fitting jobs to old workers: making work arrangements more flexible  
  
Alternative, flexible work arrangements can encourage the elderly to work longer. At 
the individual level, the likelihood of employment depends on the interaction between 
                                                 
8 Replacement rate is the proportion of retirement income as compared to pre-retirement income. The implicit 
tax is the sum of the actual taxes paid on earnings and the reduction of retirement payments due to “in-
retirement activity.”   
Box 2: Push and pull factors of labor market withdrawal 
 
Several “pull” or “push” factors influence work and retirement decisions of old workers. Pull factors are 
associated primarily with financial incentives facing the individual, and push factors with circumstances that 
restrict job opportunities available to an individual. 
 
Among the most common factors that pull workers into retirement are financial incentives provided by pension 
schemes and other formal or informal early retirement schemes. In this regard, the age at which pension funds 
are accessible, their generosity and how additional years of work change the present value of net pension wealth 
play key roles in influencing retirement decision of workers. In many developed countries other welfare schemes 
– such as unemployment benefits and disability benefits – are also often used by workers as a means of early exit 
from work.  In addition, private pension arrangements and joint retirement decisions of couples may also pull 
workers into retirement in some countries, particularly for those who value leisure. In developing countries, 
family obligations – such as helping with childcare of grand children – also pull workers into retirement. 
 
“Push” factors include both firm and individual circumstances that restrict suitable job opportunities.  At the 
firm level these include negative perceptions about the capacities of old workers, labor costs exceeding 
contribution to output  by old workers, and difficulties firms face in adjusting employment as a result of 
employment protection rules. At the individual level these include skills mismatch in the face of technological 
and structural changes in labor demand, perceptions on low returns to further training, work related stress, poor 
health and inflexibility to change working hours. 
 
Source: OECD (2006).    
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individual’s functional capacity, the nature of the work, his or her state of health, and the 
possibilities for work accommodation. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that among 
factors that help explain the rising participation rate of old people after 2001 in the United 
States, Friedberg (2007) singled out more flexible arrangements that increased the choice of 
old workers. Similarly, Ruhm (1990) and Friedberg (2004) found that old workers preferred 
more flexible work arrangements (that is, part-time or shorter-hour jobs) as such “bridge” 
jobs suit old workers on their path to retirement. This increase was particularly notable 
among relatively educated and well-off workers. Moreover, Buddelmeyer, Mourre and Ward 
(2005) showed that increasing the flexibility of labor markets by stimulating part-time 
employment as an alternative to full-time employment prolonged labor force participation of 
old workers by several years. Such jobs offer hourly wage rates below ones offered to full-
time workers (OECD 1999) – but given the choice of more flexible work arrangements, this 
is a price many of old workers are willing to pay. Moreover, the OECD (2006) notes that 
better working conditions also play a key role in encouraging longer working lives. 
 
Making old people healthier  
 
Making old people healthier will also contribute to their desire to work longer. Not 
surprisingly, research shows that poor health has a negative effect on the likelihood of being 
in the workforce, on the expected retirement age, as well as hours worked and wages (for a 
survey, see Currie and Madrian 1999). But while it is clear that people’s health affects their 
ability to work, it surely must affect also their desire to work: if poor health leads people to 
withdraw from the labor force by making even simple tasks painful and by rendering people 
less productive (which affects, among other things, their wages), then good health does just 
the reverse. By implication, improving health of old workers, coupled with the fact that jobs 
are becoming less physically demanding than they were in the past, will thus contribute to the 
desire of old workers to work longer, as well as – if opportunities exist – lead to their longer 
working lives.  
 
Recent research suggests that people indeed not only live longer, but also live longer 
healthy – the so-called “healthy aging” hypothesis, that is, the regime where longevity gains  
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translate into gains in healthy life years. For the period since the early 1980s, Munnell and 
Libby (2007) show that in the US there has been a steady reduction of the proportion of men 
aged 45-64 with activity limitations and disabilities; research which has been corroborated by 
Dormont, Martins, Pelgrin and Suhrcke (2007) for Europe and Japan. However, Dormont et 
al (2007) caution that keeping the “healthy aging” regime in the future may call for “large 
investments in health care, which to be sustainable may require in turn a careful design of 
insurance mechanisms and use of technological progress.”
9   
 
In developing countries, increasing choice often means helping old workers to 
withdraw form the labor market if they opt to do so.  Evidence shows that labor market 
duality, the hallmark of many developing countries, carries over to old age and importantly 
determines the fate of old workers: in contrast to formal sector workers who retire before 
they reach 60, mostly because they are mandated to do so, informal sector workers (such as 
self-employed and casual workers) continue to work full-time into very old ages, and exit 
mostly for health reasons (for the example of Sri Lanka, see Vodopivec and Arunatilaka 
2007). Improving choices of old workers thus requires both improving their health and 
removing mandatory retirement provisions, to help them to continue working, as well as 
providing them independent sources of income (via extending the coverage of old age 
income support systems), to enable them to resign from work, if they wish so.    
 
4. How to Stimulate Employers to Offer More Jobs to Old Workers? 
 
Above we discussed ways in which to make working places more appealing to 
workers and how to improve choices of workers.  We now turn to possible measures that will 
increase the demand for old workers, focusing on labor market institutions and skills of old 
workers.  
                                                 
9 Dormont et al (2007) contrast the “healthy aging” regime with two extremes: (i) an optimistic "compression of 
morbidity" hypothesis, maintaining that there is a reduction in morbidity and disability in the last years of life 
that makes life expectancy similar to disease- and disability-free life expectancy, and (ii) a pessimistic 
"expansion of morbidity" hypothesis, where all gains in longevity translate into years in poor health.  
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Removing institutional obstacles  
 
Introducing flexible wage determination can increase the employability of old 
workers, if institutional rigidities prevent wages adjusting to changes in life-cycle 
productivity of workers.  As discussed above, on average, the productivity of a worker 
eventually decreases as he or she ages. If changes in the wage level across individual’s 
working life do not adjust to reflect such changes in his or her productivity, employers are 
likely to be reluctant to retain old workers and to prefer hiring of young workers. Reflecting 
individuals’ productivity profiles, wage-age profiles in many countries are indeed hump-
shaped and are thus consistent with employability of old workers (see OECD 2006 for a 
description of profiles in OECD countries).
10 In some countries, however, rigidities 
embedded in the wage determination system prevent relative wages of old workers from 
reflecting underlying productivities, thus undermining employment opportunities for old 
workers: The OECD (2006) singles out Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, and 
above we showed evidence for Slovenia (where, similar to other successor states of 
Yugoslavia, the law mandates a 0.5 percent increase of wage level per year of work 
experience). Based on cross-country analysis, the OECD (2006) provides evidence of a 
negative impact of high relative wages on employment opportunities of old workers (drop in 
retention and hiring rates of male older workers).
11 To circumvent such seniority bonuses, 
most workers in Japan in Korea are forced to retire from their career jobs at the age of 60 or 
55, and many of them continue working by taking lower-paying jobs with the same or other 
firms, shift to part-time or temporary work, or start self-employment (OECD 2006, 
Williamson and Higo 2007).  
   
Restrictive employment protection legislation (EPL) may create disincentives for 
employment of old workers. In principle it is not possible to predict the impact of strict EPL 
on labor market outcomes for old workers, as such provisions may lead to both greater 
retention of old workers as well as to the reduction in their hiring. While the empirical 
                                                 
10 Note, however, that wage-age profiles based on cross-sectional data reflect not only life-cycle changes in 
wage levels but also changes in the composition of the workforce. 
11 Daniel and Heywood (2007) also show that U.K. firms that use seniority bonuses hire a smaller share of old 
workers.  
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evidence is weak, some recent studies report negative effects of strict EPL on employment of 
old workers. For example, the OECD (2006) found a statistically significant association of 
strict EPL with reduction of employment and hiring rate of workers aged 50-64 based on 
cross-section analysis for OECD countries, and reports a number of country studies which 
identified strict EPL as a barrier to the hiring or retention of older workers (Belgium, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, and Spain). Note that by 
reducing the flows in and out of workforce, strict EPL also contributes to a “compression” of 
working lives, the compression that is increasingly identified as an obstacle for a better 
reconciliation of work and family as well as for the investment in human capital (Bovenberg 
2007).  
 
Preventing age discrimination– via enacting anti-discrimination legislation as well as 
conducting information campaigns and promoting guidelines about employment of old 
workers is also an important objective.  While difficult to prove, survey evidence in OECD 
countries suggests that workplace age discrimination exists, as 1-14 percent of workers 
reported that during the previous 12 months they either personally experienced or witnessed 
it.
12 But anti-discrimination laws may not always be effective, and they may have significant 
unintended effects.
13 The OECD (2006) thus argues for the combination of anti-
discrimination laws with information campaigns and guidelines. The UK Age Positive 
campaign is one example; this campaign promotes age diversity at work through a practical 
guide for business in the areas of recruitment, selection of candidates, promotion, training 
and development, layoffs, and retirement, with detailed explanation of the guidelines and 
indicators for assessing conformity with them (UK 2007). 
 
                                                 
12 Based on an experiment to test for age discrimination (sending out resumes for job applicants with different 
ages and measuring the response rate of employers asking for interviews), Lahey (2005) determined that 
employers clearly treated older workers differently. For example, she found that to receive a job offer for a 
clerical position, it would take 1-10 weeks for a worker aged about 35 and 14-20 weeks for a worker aged about 
60. 
13 For example, in US a law prohibits age-based discrimination of hiring, firing, layoffs, and compensation, but 
as one researcher noted, in practice, “the law may have only limited benefits and significant costs. Although the 
laws provide a boon for older men who remain in their jobs and are more difficult to fire, they harm those 
seeking new employment.”  
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Improving employability of old workers  
 
To increase the attractiveness of old workers to employers, new generations old 
workers should possess better skills, which calls for life-long learning – including learning 
toward the end of work career. Indeed, several considerations speak in favor of such 
development. First, if the anticipated age of retirement increases, the “break even” age of 
training increases, as the payoffs to training are spread over longer work period. Second, the 
OECD (1998) also argues that if workers undergo continued training throughout the career, it 
is unlikely that they will experience a decline in their trainability in the old age. Third, 
because the retention rates of old workers are high, training old workers may be as profitable 
as training younger ones. Indeed, the OECD (1998) reports that retention rates of workers 
aged 45 years or more were higher than those of younger workers in six out of the nine 
OECD countries studied, and, unsurprisingly, that incidence rates of training among those 
aged 45 to 54 years was about as high as the incidence for those aged 25 to 44 years (21 vs. 
23 percent for unweighted country averages). 
 
Better reconciliation of work and family also calls for continual investment in human 
capital. Recent socio-economic developments, especially feminization of work, have changed 
the sharing of family responsibilities and Bovenberg (2007) argues that a key challenge is a 
need to maintain a highly skilled workforce while allowing parents to strengthen their family 
life. The changing nature of risks over the life cycle will thus make life-long learning a key 
factor in reconciling the occasionally conflicting requirements of work and family, because 
well-trained workers are better able to both pursue personal fulfillment and stable personal 
relationships, as well as to supply highly productive labor and thus contribute to high levels 
of employment and labor productivity on a macro level. Higher investments in human capital 
throughout the working career will also facilitate and motivate workers to work longer. 
Moreover, we believe that there is also a powerful reverse causality at work: if their working 
life is expected to last longer, workers will be eager to make investments in their skills, and 




5. Concluding remarks  
 
The above discussion suggests that the perplexing long-term trend of reduced time 
spent at work – a paradoxical result in light of persistent gains in longevity – will have to 
change: working longer is an imperative, because it boosts workforce growth, strengthens 
public finances, and increases retirement incomes. The paper claims that to achieve the goal 
of working longer, polices should stimulate both the supply of labor by old workers – by 
making work in old age more attractive in financial and non-financial terms (the latter, 
among others, by offering flexible working arrangements and by improving health of old 
workers), and the demand for it by employers – by removing restrictive labor market 
institutions, fostering life-long learning, and addressing age discrimination.  
 
When implemented in conjunction, the proposed policy measures would reinforce 
each other and create synergies. Improvements in health of old workers would allow many to 
continue earning and postpone retirement, the outcome which would be facilitated by 
employers offering more flexible working conditions as well as by workers undergoing life-
long learning that would enhance their employability. Moreover, the resulting lighter 
pressure on pension systems would positively affect public finances and overall economic 
growth. And better health, enhanced old- age income support and the ability to choose when 
to retire would all contribute to better intergenerational relations and improved attitudes 
towards the old people.  
 
Despite promising signs of change in some countries and in view of technological 
advances that allow for more flexible work arrangements (such as advances in information 
and communication technology), formulating and fine-tuning the policies to promote 
working longer remains a task for future research. Above all, research should shed light on 
the best ways to foster life-long learning of workers (on the type of training and modalities of 
financing), what kind of financial incentives and work arrangements are best suited to keep 
workers in the workforce, and what are the best ways to combat age discrimination. 
Moreover, better understanding of how to prevent early exits from main lifetime jobs is also 
warranted, particularly in countries where workers after exiting from such jobs continue to  
  20
work, but in much less productive jobs. In many countries postponing early exit from lifetime 
jobs calls for removing rigidities of wage-setting process; this is not an easy task, yet large 
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Summary Findings
An aging population and the corresponding shrinkage of the labor
force will create a significant drag on economic growth and may
jeopardize the economic well-being of some of the elderly. Thus working
longer is an imperative – but extending working lives has proven
difficult, both because workers do not want to work longer and because
employers are lukewarm about employing older workers. As measures
that can be taken to motivate workers to work longer, the paper proposes
providing retirement incentives and attractive, flexible working
arrangements. To induce employers to hire old workers, it suggests
removing the obstacles imposed by restrictive labor market institutions,
an increase in the human capital of workers via life-long learning, and
to addressing age-discrimination. Chances for extending working lives
will also increase as the health of elderly workers is improved.
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